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ABSTRACT
The visual field is the spatial form of visual awareness, that is, immediate visual experience ignoring
qualities and meanings. Such an entity only exists in the discursive representation, for the awareness as
such is quality and meaning throughout. Thus the discursive, formal treatment is necessarily limited.
We identify a number of important distinctions of a geometrical nature. This description is confronted
with experimental phenomenology, that is the psychology of the Gestalt Schools, and with well known
principles of artistic practice. We also trace the connections with biology, especially ethology, aesthet-
ics, and the field of cognitive science based upon Cassirer’s concept of symbolic forms.
c© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Geometry of the Visual Field
In this paper we discuss the simultaneous structure of visual
awareness, often referred to as the “visual field”. It is an op-
erationally defined “geometry” (not in the conventional, formal
sense), explored through experimental phenomenology (Alber-
tazzi, 2014).
We know the visual field only through immediate visual
awareness, it has no existence outside of that. Although a
twofold extended manifold (topologically a “plane”), it is ev-
idently very much unlike your trusty Euclidean plane (Casey,
1885; Coxeter, 1969). It has the topology of the disk, with an
ill defined boundary. It has finite, graded resolution. Moreover,
there is evidence that at any single location a range of resolu-
tions is “active”. It manifests itself often differently from one
glimpse to the next.
Although the visual field is familiar to everybody as part of
immediate visual awareness, it is generally considered to have
roots in the physiology of the “visual front end”, composed of
eye, retina, primary visual cortex, and (according to choice) up
to a few dozen “visual areas”.
Many scientists even go as far as to identify the visual field
with the front-end. This is an unfortunate move. The relations
between the “physical world” in front of the observer, the “opti-
cal structure”, that is the radiance incident upon the cornea, the
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“brain activity”, that are electrochemical processes in the skull
of the observer, and the “visual awareness” that is part of the
mind of the observer, are ill, if at all, understood. Causal rela-
tions are not possible between the ontologically distinct levels
of physics and mind. Here one relies on “bridging hypotheses”
of various kinds. An example is the “isomorphism” hypothesis
used in early Gestalt psychology (Koehler, 1920). The mod-
ern conviction that somatotopy explains the visual field (Kaas,
1990) is essentially a variation on that. It is embarrassing in its
naı¨vite´. Thus the topic of the “geometry” of the visual field is a
challenging one. It stands in need of formal development.
In this paper we intentionally circumvent the hairiest prob-
lems by using an abstract overall model of the genesis of visual
awareness. This allows us to straddle the wide ontological gap
in a simple, formal manner.
It is important to understand that the visual field is a mysteri-
ous place. This may not be so evident in focal vision, but it be-
comes immediately evident in attempts to experience eccentric
vision. Fixate a point in the scene in front of you, and concen-
trate your mind on a location away from the fixation point. But
make sure not to look at that location! Try to describe the best
you can what is your visual awareness. This will be hard, very
hard. Words are only somewhat useful here, sketching your ex-
perience as a simple doodle is perhaps more appropriate. The
things you are aware of will be very difficult to describe, no
matter how, and have only a fleeting existence.
This experience is not particular to the eccentric visual field.
It is not different in “vision proper”. For mystery is every-
where, although most people never notice (Ruskin, 1842, 1846,
21856a,b, 1857, 1860).
Here is an exercise that will prove this to you. Sit in front of
a bookcase at such a distance that you are just unable to read
the booktitles, whereas you are well aware of the lettering and
so forth. Try to draw exactly what you see. This exercise is like
Chinese torture, at least if you play it honestly. Yet this type
of mystery is what your vision deals with on a regular basis.
“Understanding vision” certainly implies that you can deal with
what goes on here. At this particular stage in history no one can,
which is why it is—or at least, should be—an important frontier
of science.
The simultaneous presence in your awareness evidently is of
some “geometrical” nature. But it is a geometry that is hard to
describe. Even being able to discuss the phenomenology should
count as important progress. Here we give it a try, for better or
worse. Any little headway—even just grasping the magnitude
of the problem—is certain to be useful.
1.1. Geometrical Configurations
“Configurations” are entities like triangles, circles, irregular
“blobs”, and so forth. “Geometrical configurations” are struc-
tures composed of points, and lines, that satisfy certain con-
straints. In this section we deal exclusively with such geomet-
rical configurations.
1.1.1. Fiducial Geometrical Elements
The basic geometrical elements are uniform areas, and local
marks (to be amplified below). A common uniform area in daily
life is the blue sky. It is a single non-composite entity, that is to
say, it is by no means composed of points, or pixels. In a digital
photograph the blue sky is “made up” of blue pixels. In visual
awareness there is no such notion.
In the simplest cases, which are rare, the local marks have
no further structure, and may be considered “points”. Geomet-
rically, a point is fully characterized by its location. The fact
that one ignores its internal structure makes it a point. (Euclid:
“a point is that which has no parts” (Casey, 1885; Kandinsky,
1959). However, only the fact that there usually is an internal
structure makes it possible to identify the point. A bit like our
university town Leuven on a map of the world. It gives the
point its individuality (see figure 1). As said above, there are no
points in the blue sky, this is because that would violate Leibniz
(1969) Identity of Indiscernibles. Other than internal geomet-
rical structure, a point might have qualities, e.g., color. We are
not concerned with qualities here. A point is thus created by
“placing” it. It is an intentional entity.
To place a point is an intentional act of psychogenesis1. Psy-
chogenesis starts as a mere “hallucination”, and gains existen-
tial power when it completes “reality checks” in the visual front
end (Brown, 1977). The “placing” is relative to other matter in
the visual field, which also has “evidence” of some kind in the
visual front end (see figure 2). Visual awareness is a purely
mental affair, whereas the “evidence” in the visual front end
1Notice that we use “psychogenesis” in preference to the more conventional
term “microgenesis”. This usage should hardly be objectionable, since alterna-
tive uses of psychogenesis play no role here.
Fig. 1. Here are some “points”. Of course, a “point” is a point only
at a scale when its internal structure is ignored. The internal struc-
ture still gives the point an identity. The possibilities are infinite.
Something is a “point” if your psychogenesis designates it that. A
point may “explode” into structure when you scrutinize.
is based upon patterns of electrochemical activity, the world
as you—or rather some brain scientist—might find inside your
skull. Brain activity is physical structure, in principle not dif-
ferent from footprints in the sand of a beach. The “meaning”
of such patterns is again due to psychogenesis. One is deal-
ing with a circular process here. Psychogenesis “accounts for”
front end activity by adjusting its hallucinations in a suitable
manner. This explains why it increases your biological fitness.
Fig. 2. At left the famous Kanizsa triangle (Kanizsa, 1997). It shows
a depth layering that will be discussed later in the paper. Here it
is of interest that the gray points in the figure at center are “in-
tentionally placed”, whereas the points indicated in the righthand
figure do not exist in this manner.
Psychogenesis is a systolic process, that delivers updates at
a rate of about a dozen a second (Brown, 1977). Thus it just
keeps up with the volatile, continuously overwritten, contents
of the front end buffers. The updates are in legato style, thus it
is not possible to identify individual “frames” as in a video clip.
Thus time is continuous, although the “moments”, as recorded
by an external observer, have finite duration. We’ll succinctly
speak of “beats”, no moment implying a discrete structure.
The beats of psychogenesis occur phenomenologically as
glimpses of immediate visual awareness. Awareness “just hap-
pens” to you, there is nothing you can do about it. Actually, it
would be better to drop the “to you”, because immediate aware-
ness does not involve a notion of “self”, although we won’t
press this point.
A “point” of the visual field is thus a formal, intentional en-
tity. It may or may not re-occur at the next beat of the psycho-
genetic process. If it does, it is still a novel creation, it does not
“endure”. The continued being of a point is due to its recreation
from beat to beat. The psychogenetic process tries to account
3for the front end activity best as it can. Its “reality checks” are
bound to yield slightly different results from beat to beat, even
if the scene is fixed. This is modeled by treating a point as a
stochastic element.
We use an isotropic normal distribution, and draw a fresh
location at every beat. The center of the distribution may be
regarded as the goal of the intentional act, whereas the sample
may be regarded as the result after the “reality check”. This is
how the physical world, through the physiology of the front end,
appears to modulate awareness, an empty notion, because psy-
chogenesis “modulates” itself.
Over some time span one meets with various instances of the
point that statistically define a “fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965) point-like
entity. We sometimes speak of “fuzzy points”, and by that will
refer to the distribution of successive instantiations of a single
fiducial point. (See figure 3.)
Fig. 3. At left a small, at center a large point (threatening to fill the
frame!). In this representation, the blacker, the more point there
is. Either point is formally represented with the iconic point at
right. This symbolic point is just an abstract representation, it has
no size the way real points have.
Such a system has the advantage that psychogenesis may ig-
nore optical structure, and that it may hallucinate structure for
which no front-end structure is present at all, a frequent occa-
sion in daily life. On the whole, vision is bound to promote the
agent’s fitness—in the biological sense—though. The process
creates a “reality” that is likely to subserve efficacious actions
(Hoffman, 2009).
Intentional points may have two degrees of freedom. In sim-
ple terms, they may be shifted left-right and/or up-down. In
case some constraint is active, the freedom may be less, even
zero. If there is non-zero freedom, the point will be called a
“fiducial point with so and so many degrees of freedom”.
1.1.2. Bound Geometrical Elements
Some geometrical elements are purely intentional, in that
they do not rely on a reality check in the front end at all. Per-
haps the simplest example is a line through two points. We
may assume the points to be fiducial points with two degrees of
freedom. We draw a line through the points as in Euclidean ge-
ometry. There is no need to do any reality checking, the points
take care of that. One might say the line is “freely invented”—a
psychologist would say“amodal”, or “hallucinated”—which is
why we speak of a “bound geometrical element”. It is deter-
mined when the points have been placed, hence “bound”. One
often believes to see such bound lines between the luminous
points of a stellar configuration like the big dipper (Ursa ma-
jor, see figure 4 (Metzger, 1953)).
From one beat of psychogenesis to the next the points are
replaced with fresh ones, thus the line varies too. However, it
never fails to pass exactly through the points. This is a trivial
Fig. 4. The constellation Ursa major (“the big dipper”). The
“Bru¨ckenlinien” (“bridge lines”) of the Gestalt psychologists have
been independently seen by cultures all over the globe. In that
sense they are “real” enough.
fact because the line is defined as an intentional element that
passes through the points. It is an “ideal” geometrical element.
Over some time span one meets with various instances of
the line that statistically define a “fuzzy” line-like entity. We
sometimes speak of “fuzzy lines”, and by that will refer to the
distribution of successive instantiations of a single bound line.
The model we have set up here is different from perhaps more
familiar models in that geometrical relations, such as the in-
cidence of a point and a line, are exact, whereas the entities
themselves, here the point and the line, may be fuzzy. This is
possible because the visual field is an ideal entity, quite dif-
ferent from the front end activity, which does not readily ad-
mit of a geometrical interpretation at all. The front end ac-
tivity is not intentional, being just an outskirt of the physical
world, whereas awareness is. Psychogenesis creates meaning,
whereas the world has merely meaningless structure (Langer,
1953). This can hardly be otherwise, since any meaning must
eventually be due to non-contradicted experience of the agent
in the world (von Uexku¨ll, 1928; Riedl, 1987).
1.2. Geometrical Constraints
Geometrical constraints are rather common in intentional
geometrical configurations. A simple example is a configura-
tion composed of a collinear triple of points. Such triplets are
extremely rare, because a triplet of three random points is truly
collinear with probability zero. A triplet of collinear points can
occur as an intentional configuration though. Here is how:
Consider two (distinct) fiducial points A and C say, and the
bound line `AC that is incident with both. Add a third point B
on that line. The point B is a fiducial point with only a single
degree of freedom, it can only be shifted along the line `AC.
The collinear triple is defined as this construction. It is an in-
tentional element with five degrees of freedom, two each for the
pointsA, C, and one for the point B. (See figure 5.)
The point B is an example of a constrained element. It is
easy enough to find examples of even more strongly constrained
points. Consider two lines `KL (through the fiducial points K
and L), and `MN (through the fiducial pointsM and N). The
point of intersection (P say) of the lines `KL and `MN has no
freedom at all. It is a “bound point”, in the sense of “amodal”.
The point P invariably lies exactly on the intersection of the
4Fig. 5. At left instances of a collinear triple (gray–white–gray), and
(directly below it) the average of the instances. It is a perfectly
collinear configuration, as all of the instances are. Of course, the
exact location of the “midpoint” is fuzzy. At right instances of a
three point configuration (gray–white–gray), each point fully in-
tentionally placed, with some unavoidable random deviation. Di-
rectly below it we show the average of these instances. It is not a
true collinear configuration, as none of its instances are. For the
former collinear triple all angles are identically 180◦. These are
categorically distinct cases.
lines `KL and `MN , despite the fact that the fiducial points K ,
L,M, and N vary with each new instantiation. The point P is
also “fuzzy”, but the geometrical relations remain intact.
1.2.1. Fiducial Elements and Dependent Elements
Geometrical configurations are defined by incidence rela-
tions, and instantiated by—intentionally—setting the fiducial
elements. The definition is part of the configuration, it is its ab-
stract shape. It is an intentional entity of a higher order. Some
elements in the configuration will be fiducial to various degrees,
perhaps they are partially constrained. Others are bound, like
the point of intersection of two intentional lines, each defined
by a pair of fiducial points.
The bound elements are dependent upon the fiducial ones,
relative to the shape. Some elements may be of mixed, bound
and fiducial, nature. The collinear triplet of points yields a sim-
ple example that comprises all these relations. (See figure 5.)
Such geometry was first studied by Hjelmslev (1923).
1.3. Geometrical Constructions
Geometrical constructions are operational definitions of
shapes. It is important to appreciate that shapes that look the
same on first blush may actually be very different because of
their diverse origin.
For instance, here is an alternative construction of a collinear
triple of points (see figure 6): Start by constructing two distinct
collinear triplesABC andUVW according to the method dis-
cussed above. Construct the lines `AU , `BV, and `CW. Next
bisect the line segments AU, BV, and CW; call these mid-
points P, Q, and R. Then the triple of points PQR is collinear,
by application of Hjelmslev’s theorem (Martin, 1998).
Notice that the collinear triplet PQR has ten degrees of free-
dom, whereas all three points are bound. It is completely dif-
ferent from a triplet like ABC, or UVW, which both have
five degrees of freedom, namely two fiducial points with two
degrees of freedom, and one constrained point with a single
degree of freedom. It is crucial to distinguish between such
entities.
1.4. Structural complexity of Geometrical Configurations
The Hjelmslev configuration described above (see figure 6)
has ten degrees of freedom. It is made up of nine points and
a cb
u
w
v
p
r
q
Fig. 6. This is the Hjelmslev configuration. The collinear triples
a–b–c and u–v–w give rise to the completely bound triple p–q—q.
six lines. This is structurally already more complicated than
the psychogenesis bottleneck can handle. We need to take this
bottleneck into account.
Geometrical configurations soon become very complicated.
Given half a dozen (6) points, one may draw 15 lines, the lines
again define 105 points of intersection. This is far beyond the
capabilities of psychogenesis. The structural complexity that
may be handled by psychogenesis is (roughly speaking) limited
by the magical number seven, plus or minus two (Miller, 1956).
The limit seems to be about half a dozen degrees of freedom,
implying a triangle. A triangle (see figure 7) is a configuration
of three points and three lines, dividing the plane in seven areas.
Three medians, and their common intersection, the centroid, are
implied. They define the “pointing directions” of the triangle
(Metzger, 1953; Langer, 1953), and mutually divide the plane
into three regions.
Fig. 7. A triangle induces various segmentations of the space
around it. This example of an equilateral triangle is, of course,
ambiguous. There are three potential regions that might contain
points the “triangle is pointing at”. In this case the “pointing direc-
tion” is of course ambiguous, the three directions seeming equally
compelling.
A generic quadrangle has eight degrees of freedom, and is al-
ready too complicated for psychogenesis to handle. Constraints
that lower the complexity bring the quadrangle into the reach
of psychogenesis though: you obtain the parallelogram and the
rectangle (both six degrees of freedom), and the square (five de-
grees of freedom). Notice that the square is even simpler than
the generic triangle.
It is of considerable interest that these configurations are not
rotationally invariant. Even an isosceles triangle is best appre-
ciated when its axis of bilateral symmetry is vertical (Metzger,
1953). A geometrical square, which has two distinct types of
axes of bilateral symmetry, appears as a square when one of
these is vertical, as a diamond when the other one is vertical
5(see figure 8) (Mach, 1886; Pinna, 2009). Here “vertical” ap-
plies if the drawing board is empty. Other elements (e.g., draw-
ing a “frame” around the figure) may induce a different refer-
ence orientation that takes over the role of the vertical (Pinna,
2009).
Fig. 8. At left square and a diamond, at right they are influenced
through context. The “square” can be seen as a “diamond” and
vice versa if the context is adjusted appropriately.
More complicated configurations include the regular poly-
gons. (See figure 9.) The hexagons are immediately recog-
nized, the pentagon less so, even when presented in a canonical
orientation, that is to say, with a major axis of bilateral sym-
metry in the vertical. Polygons with seven or more vertices are
recognized as sparsely sampled circles. They have no “sides”,
but the points are seen to lie on a circle (Metzger, 1953). Sim-
ilar things happen when a series of points apparently lies on a
curved arc. Such arcs may even have inflections. When points
are added “outside the arc”, these are indeed seen as extraneous
elements.
The phenomenological fact that arcs become visible through
discrete, non-collinear point-triples, suggests that objects not
unlike “splines” may be posed by psychogenesis (Zo¨llner,
1860; Fantoni and Gerbino, 2003). (See figures 10 and 11.)
1.5. The Atlas Structure
If psychogenesis handles only structural complexity of about
half a dozen degrees of freedom, then how can it be that one
— as experience seems to teach one — may become aware of
rather complex pictures? There are four important properties of
vision that make this indeed possible:
Independent processing psychogenesis mainly yields rela-
tively precise geometrical descriptions in an area about the
fixation point. However, it does so at a fast rate, the beats
follow each other up at at least a dozen a second. From
one beat to the next the fixation may shift. This is handled
in a pre-conscious fashion by psychogenesis. In the course
of a second or so one collects a number of samples that be-
come integrated in a “good glance”. A good glance is still
largely “something that happens to you”. There is no cog-
nitive process implied here. Of course, cognition kicks in
soon, and various voluntary fixations are interspersed with
the involuntary ones. The transitions between pure aware-
ness, visual cognition, and reflective thought (involving
scruteny) are gradual, and ill understood.
Summarizing psychogenesis often “summarizes” structure,
thus rendering it manageable. Of course, much of the
available structure is sacrificed, that is to say: simply ig-
nored, in the process. This is a very important ability of
psychogenesis, it is genuinely creative. What appears to
Fig. 9. The regular polygons that may appear in the visual field.
From about six vertices on one sees a circle, rather than a polygon.
Fig. 10. A field of points. Notice that the smooth curve is immedi-
ately noticed. Points not upon it are seen as intruders. A point
configuration like this on the night sky would probably give rise
to a stellar constellation named like “snake”, “winding path”, or
“Venus’ girdle”, and so forth, depending upon the culture.
happen is that psychogenesis forces some kind of flexi-
ble template, one of many, on the structure, in thoroughly
Procrustean manner. Such a procedure is useful when the
range of possibilities is limited, and the structure is noisy.
Then extreme structural complexity is simply ignored as
“noise”. It is a bit like “Greeking” in setting type: whole
paragraphs are simply “represented” through a gray sil-
houette, not a single word is actually set. The creativity
involved is similar to “cartooning”, or even “caricaturing”.
Psychogenesis somehow reveals the “gist” of a local struc-
ture.
Texturizing is somewhat similar to summarizing. It is applied
to areas of high structural content that has some degree of
statistical stationarity. In that sense it is similar to “hatch-
ing” in drawing. The statistical complexity of texture can
be quite high, though it is hard to express in terms of the
number of degrees of freedom involved. One would guess
perhaps “the magical number seven plus or minus two”
again.
Scale space hierarchy As mentioned before, a “point” is a
“point” only because its internal structure is intentionally
ignored. Psychogenesis is somehow able to focus not only
on location, but also on scale, to a limited extent even si-
multaneously. Thus a configuration may be composed of
configurations on a finer scale, and may itself figure as an
element in a configuration on coarser scale. It is as if a
“point” may contain a summary of what is “in” it. Geo-
metrical relations only exist on a given scale though. It is
similar to the geometrical relation between the Tour Eif-
fel and the Brandenburger Tor. The geometrical relation
6Fig. 11. From left to right: a row of points; two collinear rows that
are mutually offset; a smooth curve has been interpolated through
the points. Notice that it is apparent in the point set at left; At
right the well known “Poggendorff illusion” (Zo¨llner, 1860): the
upper oblique line at right is collinear with the oblique line at left,
although it doesn’t look that way; at far right the offset made ex-
plicit. It is like the rectangle had a different width “than it really
has”.
Fig. 12. Example of “cartographic generalization”. This is how a
single region would be rendered differently on maps of different
scales. Here the cutouts have been rescaled to the same size.
between them on the map of Europe is inherited from the
relation between Paris and Berlin. The Arc de Triomphe
has exactly the same relation to the Brandenburger Tor as
the Tour Eiffel has, although – on the map of Paris – they
are at distinct spatial locations.
Of course, this causes many complications in the formal de-
scription of the visual field. This despite the fact that these
abilities greatly simplify the task psychogenesis serves.
In almost all respects, the visual field is very unlike a picture.
A better analogy, for the moment, at least, would be a data-
structure similar to a geographical atlas. Typical atlases indeed
implement many of the properties of psychogenesis, and for
much the same reasons. These reasons have to do with the bot-
tleneck of structural complexity that psychogenesis deals with.
The map-maker has to ensure that a user, handicapped through
tunnel-vision and a bird-brain, can actually “read” the map(s)
in an efficacious manner. Here are some common map design
objectives and the way the map-maker deals with them (see fig-
ure 12)2:
— a map cannot have arbitrary size, or the user will have se-
rious problems to find the relevant area. Thus an atlas is
divided into pages, each page being of manageable size.
A very coarse map is provided to help locate the relevant
page. If necessary this is repeated in hierarchical fashion
(world map, continent, country, region, . . . ). The coarse
map is similar to the “gist”, the pages similar to “good
looks”. This implements independent processing.
— a map maker uses generalization in order to be able to put
various entities on the map. For instance, cities below a
2http://openstreetmap.us/~migurski/streets-and-routes/
certain size will be represented through conventional sym-
bols. Small villages will be omitted altogether. This im-
plements summarizing. The disk is like a “point” in that
only its location matters, not its shape, color, and so forth.
— a map maker uses conventional color and hatching to indi-
cate areal properties such as sea, ocean, desert, savannah,
forest, and so forth. This is the analogue of texturizing. It
is very helpful, because it allows one to obtain a rough un-
derstanding of the landscape at a glance, at the cost of min-
imal structural complexity. Many atlases will have several
pages of the same region, revealing different areal prop-
erties. This is very similar to the various “maps” one en-
counters in the visual front end. In ancient maps white
areas would indicate “mystery”, that is to say, unexplored
regions where anything might be. The mystery might be
made explicit by printing “here be dragons” (e.g., hc svnt
dracones on the Hunt-Lenox globe (ca. 1503–07)3), or
pictures of mythological creatures like mermins.
— a detailed atlas will be organized like an inclusion hierar-
chy. If one needs more detail one pages to a map of higher
resolution. Of course, such a map will cover a more lim-
ited area, though in greater detail. Two such finely detailed
maps can only be mutually related by way of a coarser map
that contains summaries of both. This is the scale space
hierarchy (Koenderink, 1984). Notice that the scale space
hierarchy is only useful because of the summarizing that
goes on at all levels. It is the summarizing that provides
the “glue”, making the atlas into a unitary structure, rather
than a mere collection of mutually unrelated pages.
The atlas analogy is a very apt one. It may be the best way
to understand the structure of the visual field. (But see below
for complications.) For all the map-maker’s devices one finds
obvious analogs in the visual field. Notice that this structure is
fundamentally different from a “picture”.
If there is anything like a picture at all, it would be the gist.
Features in the visual field are “meaningful” because they are
part of larger structures. The larger structure is like a context,
that bestows meaning on its elements. The gist itself is not part
of anything though. It has no context, it simply is. Psycho-
genesis apparently generates “gist” from global, meaningless
structure, probably through a selection from a limited number
of templates. Indeed, it would seem that the gist is one of the
few visual elements that is largely protopathic.
1.5.1. Summaries
The nature of the “summaries” is important in the under-
standing of the structure of the visual field. One expects sum-
marizing to be similar to cartographic “generalization”. Sum-
maries are tricky entities (Ruskin, 1842, 1846, 1856a,b, 1857),
much more complicated than the simply blurred versions one
has in regular scale space theory.
3The Hunt–Lenox Globe or Lenox Globe, dating from ca. 1510, is the sec-
ond or third oldest known terrestrial globe, after the Erdapfel of 1492. It is
housed by the Rare Book Division of the New York Public Library.
7For instance, any configuration may collapse to a “point”, or
may vanish in thin air. A number of configurations may to-
gether be summarized as an arc, and so forth. In order to keep
the map legible, it is often necessary to displace configurations
from their actual location. (See figure 13.) Various distortions
may be used to keep the relations between adjacent summarized
configurations clear. All these, very common, properties of car-
tographic generalization have analogons in visual perception,
and—especially—in the art of drawing (Ruskin, 1860).
Fig. 13. The light gray “serrated square” is in front of the dark
gray one, despite the “wrong” relation of outlines (they don’t de-
fine proper “T-junctions”). However, the serrations are not visible
on the scale of the squares, thus the relation is really between their
summaries. There is no ambiguity in the relation between the sum-
maries at all.
1.5.2. General position
The notion of “general position” may also be called “gener-
icity”. Two points are “in general position” if their locations
differ. Three points are in general position if they are not mutu-
ally collinear, and all three locations are different.
Genericity depends upon the context. For instance, in a
generic square opposite sides are parallel, and all sides are of
the same length. For a generic quadrangle none of these rela-
tions obtains. A square is a quadrangle, but not a generic quad-
rangle. Thus genericity depends upon the constraints one ac-
cepts as “given”. In the visual field “given” amounts to “posed
by psychogenesis”.
It makes sense, for psychogenesis, to accept “general posi-
tion” as a prior hypothesis. This is likely to increase biological
fitness on the average. The mainstream has adopted this as the
“Bayesian model” (Jaynes, 2003; Richards and Knill, 1996).
We won’t follow the mainstream there. The Bayesian priors
refer to the statistical structure of the physical environment. It
seems unlikely that psychogenesis would entertain such priors,
although it evidently uses recurring regularities. However, such
regularities pertain between entities in awareness, rather than
entities “in the world”.
Any square you draw will necessarily be imperfect as a phys-
ical realization. However, the square in visual awareness is a
perfect square. The ideal nature of this square is purely inten-
tional, it has nothing to do with the physical realization. It is
an entity like Meinong’s “round square”, which is indeed every
bit as round, as it is square (Meinong, 1899). This is a crucial
notion that is sorely lacking from pure “bottom up” accounts of
the structure of the visual field.
Fig. 14. A region may have a complicated topology, and still appear
as a single region. Notice that—perhaps paradoxically—the region
at right looks even more like a “single” region than the one at left,
although it is evidently the more disperse one.
1.6. Basic elements
So far we have illustrated various important issues using
points as the basic elements. However, points are by no means
the only basic elements. As a first, rough categorization one
may distinguish:
◦ points that are structureless entities with two degrees of free-
dom (their location);
◦ curves (often called “lines” in the visual arts) that are ex-
tended entities, such that points may be placed upon them
with a single degree of freedom;
◦ regions (often called “areas” or “patches”) that are extended
entities, such that points may be placed upon them with
two degrees of freedom.
All these entities may have various additional qualities. For in-
stance, a “line” may have a direction, not just an orientation, it
may be one-sided, the boundary of a region, it may have well
or ill defined end-points, it may have a shape, curvature and so
forth, it may be textured, say stippled or dashed, and so forth.
An area may have a shape, which includes topological prop-
erties like connectedness; see figure 14), a boundary quality,
sharp, fuzzy, serrated, . . . , a texture, hatching, stippling, . . . ,
and so forth.
There are numerous possible relations between entities of the
same nature (coincident points, parallel lines, overlapping ar-
eas, . . . ), as well as between entities of different nature. In
many cases this involves “bound elements”. For instance, a
placed area with a sharp boundary (a “blob”) induces a line (its
boundary). The line has no freedom, it is a bound element. But,
of course, the interior might break away from the boundary (see
figures 15 and 16).
The variety of possible relations is gigantic, as we will illus-
trate below.
Fig. 15. A blobby shape is colored by neatly filling in (first from
the left), by staying away from the boundary (second, notice that
the tint becomes lighter), by coloring over the boundary (third,
notice that the tint becomes darker), by coloring only a narrow
ribbon inside the boundary (fourth, notice that some tint spreads
into the interior, like on ancient, hand-colored maps), and, finally
by paying little attention to the precise location of the boundary
(fifth). In the latter case the outline gains a “dynamic” character,
a property routinely exploited in the visual arts.
8Fig. 16. A blobby shape is outlined through multiple, slightly differ-
ent lines. Multiple “outlines” tend to appear as a single somewhat
fuzzy outline—essentially a single line—giving the region a dy-
namic, less rigid character. For such reasons one sees such struc-
tures frequently used in artistic drawings.
2. Pictures and the Visual Field
For our purposes part of what is a “picture”, in a technical
sense, to be outlined below, is a flat substrate, called “picture
plane”, of finite size, called “picture frame”, covered with col-
ors in a certain arrangement. We will consider only rectangular
frames with aspect ratios not too far from unity. With “col-
ors” we indicate any physico-chemical causes of retinal spec-
tral irradiance. Examples are pencil marks (graphite), touches
of paint (for instance, mineral compounds in an oily medium),
pre-digital photographs (silver grains in a gelatin carrier), and
so forth.
But these are conventional properties of minor importance.
Most importantly, a picture is a physical object seen in a par-
ticular mode. Apart from seeing the picture as a manipula-
ble object, viewers can look “into” a picture so as to become
aware of a pictorial world. The physical object, in the context
of such a viewing, is what we mean with a “picture” in the tech-
nical sense (Hildebrand, 1918; Langer, 1953; Koenderink et al.,
2011). Thus pictures have a rather involved ontological struc-
ture.
In looking at, and into a picture, which may be summarized
as “viewing a picture” where “picture” is properly understood,
the observer’s perception contains two distinct spaces. One is
the space the observer and the picture as an object share, often
called “the visual world” of the observer. The other is the “pic-
torial space” of the observer for the particular picture. These
spaces are distinct, and usually do not have much of a mutual
relation.4
Typically, neither the eye, nor the picture plane, are in picto-
rial space. Special cases may be set up—these are essentially
“laboratory gimmicks”—where certain relations do obtain. The
more common ones are related to “linear perspective”, and “vir-
tual reality”. The picture may appear like a “window”, where
the space you are presently in, the space seen through the win-
dow, and the window frame, are somehow amalgamated. Here
the coupling between the spaces is set up by having the picto-
rial content “require” a physical viewpoint. This is tricky, both
practically and conceptually, and sometimes even fails with an
actual window. We don’t deal with such singular cases here.
There is no direct causal relation between the picture, and the
visual awareness of the pictorial world. The relation is indirect,
4The picture plane does not separate them, for such a separation would be
a connection (Langer, 1953). Exceptions tend to be of an artificial nature, and
are usually considered “in bad taste” in the visual arts (see below).
through psychogenesis. Thus the relation may well be different
from one occasion to the next, and is likely to be different for
different observers.
The experimental phenomenology of the visual field is most
conveniently pursued through the use of pictures. Most of our
understanding of vision proper derives from such studies. This
makes sense because the study of the vision of the scene in
which the observer moves involves numerous non-optical fac-
tors. It is necessarily enactive (Gibson, 1950). The “visual
field” is by definition due to purely optical factors. This is
an important phenomenological distinction, first explicitly for-
mulated by Adolf von Hildebrand (1918). Hildebrand differ-
entiated between the Nahbild, perhaps to be translated as “en-
active image”, and the Fernbild, which might be translated as
“iconic image”. The iconic image is purely due to optical fac-
tors, whereas the enactive image involves opto-mechanical in-
teractions, such as walking around an object, manipulating an
object, using binocular vision, and others. That is why we con-
centrate on pictures, and picture making in this paper.
3. The Art of Depiction
Picture making implies an understanding of generic psy-
chogenesis in one’s own species, the main instance involving
Homo Sapiens. The artist aims at evoking certain aspects of
visual awareness in prospective observers. The major way to
achieve this is self-observation, or introspection, during and af-
ter the making of the work (Hildebrand, 1918). This involves
a blind reliance on the homogeneity of the species (Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2008).
We discuss a few examples in this section. We will focus
mainly on drawing, with a few excursions into painting. The
difference between drawing and painting is that the geometri-
cal elements in drawing are predominantly lines (“strokes”) and
points (“dots”, “stipple”), in painting mainly areas (“taches”,
“touches”). The difference is by no means absolute though.
Hatching (“hachure”) uses lines to stand for area, and certain
touches may double for lines or points. In something like hatch-
ing the twofold intentional nature of pictures is crucial.
3.1. The picture plane
Strictly speaking, there is nothing similar to the picture plane
in visual awareness. The visual field is never a pure “flatland”
(Koenderink et al., 2011), despite numerous efforts of artists to
force it to be that way. Looking at an X-glyph (like this: )
one usually sees the black stroke as being “in front”. On the
other hand, looking at an X-glyph (like this: ) one usually
sees the gray stroke as being “in front”. When looking at an
ambiguous X-glyph (like this: ) one usually sees one stroke
“in front”, although which one depends upon the particular mo-
ment. The order appears to toggle randomly, and more or less
beyond one’s control. The intersection of the strokes has a cu-
rious split nature, for it lies on both strokes. The intersection is
a superposition of two mutually “parallel” points.5 Such paral-
5“Parallel” means: at the same location, yet distinct; this is analogous to the
notion of parallel lines, which have the same orientation, yet are distinct.
9lel points occur in isotropic geometries (Strubecker, 1941a,b,c,
1945; Yaglom, 1968).
Likewise, any pictorial object lies in front of its background.
As is well known, the object-ground relationships in a drawing
may spontaneously change from one beat of psychogenesis to
the next. Then parts of the visual field are permuted “in depth”.
This type of “depth” is not more than a partial order for a rela-
tion “in front of”, that pertains to elements that are at the same
location, either crossing (like in the example), or abutting,
like the lower left corner of the gray square and the neighbor-
ing part of the interior of the black square in this figure: .
A global depth order need not exist (see figure 17), nor does
it occur in awareness, except in singular, trivial cases. When
noticed, this tends to be in reflective thought.
Fig. 17. Notice that this ribbon is both “in front of”, as well as “behind”
itself, thus showing that a global depth order cannot be expected in the
visual field. Indeed, phenomenologically depth order is a local property,
where “local” has to be understood in a sufficiently fuzzy way.
The part that “lies behind” still exists “amodally”, in that it
is somehow completed in psychogenesis. For instance it has a
“shape”. (See figures 18 and 19.) Thus the circular disk “oc-
cluded by the triangle” is evidently flattened on the (invisible)
upper part, although there is enough space to complete the cir-
cle. The gray shape that is “partly occluded” by the black rect-
angle has a smooth boundary, and so forth.
Fig. 18. Consider the shape of the gray areas. At left one sees a
“deformed circular disk” with a smooth outline, at right a circular
disk with a flattened top.
Fig. 19. Here two abutting, gray, circular disks (center) are “oc-
cluded” by a black rectangle (left). One tends to see the gray area
as a dumpbell.
3.1.1. Multiple structure
Even in slightly complicated configurations one often notices
sequences of different presentations. Each single glimpse yields
a certain well defined visual awareness, but continued looking,
even a good look of a few seconds, may well reveal a number of
qualitatively different awarenesses. It is likely that psychogen-
esis comes up with numerous ways to account for the optical
structure incident upon the retina, and that now this, now that
hallucination “wins”, and determines the presentation in aware-
ness. This is a natural consequence of the fact that vision with-
out imagination is impossible. Without its creative nature, the
visual system could only sustain the enactive vision of a zom-
bie. Although important enough—probably most of the visual
processes in the brain deal with that—this cannot lead to qual-
ities and meaning in the sense of “good horse sense”, or “gut
feeling”. In experimental phenomenology one needs to be able
to deal with this intrinsic creativity.
4. Conclusion
The “visual field” is a mental entity, the geometrical aspect
of visual awareness. Although “geometrical” indicates that one
ignores meanings and qualities, this is not really possible. The
geometrical elements are not “given”, but constructed by psy-
chogenesis. Thus the visual field is not a pre-existing frame, or
a blank canvas, ready to be colored in by psychogenesis. That
implies it is quality and meaning through and through. Quali-
ties and meanings may be ignored in our discursive models of
our visual awareness, but not in experimental phenomenology
(Albertazzi, 2014).
One might say that elements of the visual field are objecti-
fied emotions, that is to say, emotions ascribed to objects other
than the self. This explains that we experience “dynamic lines”,
“pointing triangles”, “agressive forms”, and so forth (Langer,
1953). The “geometry of the visual field” is closer related to
the structure of musical compositions than to Euclid’s formal
system (Baensch, 1923–24; Langer, 1953). It may be consid-
ered a language of vision, if “language” is understood as a way
to express and communicate reality, a notion first forcefully de-
veloped by Konrad Fiedler (1887). It was developed in the early
twentieth century in various directions, the experimental psy-
chology of the Gestalt Schools, and the work on Einfu¨hlung
(empathy) in aesthetics (Vischer, 1873; Lipps, 1914a,b; Stein,
1989; Titchener, 1909).
The notion of modes of expression6 of reality as a way of
coming to grips with psychogenesis led to the powerful con-
cept of “symbolic forms” (Cassirer, 1923, 1925, 1929; Langer,
1953). In recent times this led to the work of Rosch and Mervis
(1981) and Lakoff (1987) in psychology.
There also exists parallel threads in biology, perhaps starting
with the ideas of Jakob von Uexku¨ll (1928), that led to the ethol-
ogy of Lorenz (1973) and Tinbergen (1951). (See also Riedl
(1987)). Von Uexku¨ll’s notion of “functional tone”, is really
Gibson (1966) idea of “affordance”, but where Gibson locates
the affordance in a physical object, for von Uexku¨ll (1928) it
is like the releasers of ecology, a mental construct that is much
like a “symbol” as understood by Cassirer (1923, 1925, 1929),
or Lakoff (1987).
An understanding of the visual field is the understanding of
the language of vision on a number of different levels. These in-
clude ecology—von Uexku¨ll’s Umwelt—and ethology, namely
the releasers and fixed action patterns, in biology, the symbolic
6Language has been the major paradigm in science, but already Fiedler
(1887) generalized the notion to visual, musical, and other “languages”.
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forms of Gestalt, Carnap and Lakoff in psychology, and the
study of empathy in aesthetics.
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